| Presentación |
| 2003 |
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09:30-09:45 Introductory Presentation Joan Esteban [Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC | Barcelona (Spain)] 09:45-11:00 "Polarization and conflict: two approaches" Debraj Ray [Dpt. of Economics, New York University | New York (USA)] [ Debraj Ray's Home Page ] Summary (from Debraj Ray's last slide):
"I have discussed two approaches to the study of polarization and conflict. The axiomatic approach delivers a new set of measures which may be useful in empirical work. The behavioral approach complements the axiomatic approach by explicitly laying down a model of conflict. While the axiomatic approach is possibly of greater empirical relevance, the behavioral approach cannot be dispensed with as a conceptual check of the axioms. In particular, issues of group formation, group salience, the use of alternative forms of resources in a conflictual process and the study of negociation can be usefully studied under the behavioral approach."
The presentation was partly based on Ray, D. and J.M. Esteban. 1999. "Conflict and Distribution" Journal of Economic Theory, 87, pp. 379-415.
See also Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray. 2000. "Persistent Inequality." Unpublished [PDF]
11:30-12:30 "Agreements in the shadow of conflict" Joan Esteban [Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC | Barcelona (Spain)] [ J.M. Esteban's Home Page ] Summary (from J.M. Esteban's first slide):
"In this presentation I shall argue that the conflict approach to social and economic interactions is relevant not only to the modeling of conflict situations, but also to the understanding of cooperation when it takes place. Specifically, I shall examine from this standpoint two standard questions in the theory of collective agreements: (i) the Arrovian problem of aggregation of individual preferences and (ii) social agreements as outcomes of bargaining."
This presentation was partly based on Esteban, J. and D.Ray. 2001. "Social Rules are not Immune to Conflict." Economics of Governance, 2, pp. 59-67; Esteban, J. and J. Sákovics. 2001. "Why Lions Get the Lion's Share: A Hobbesian Theory of bargaining." Unpublished [PDF]
12:30-13:30 "Is wealth becoming more polarized in the United States'" Conchita D'Ambrosio [Istituto di Economia Politica, Università Bocconi | Milano (Italy)] [mailto: conchita.dambrosio@uni-bocconi.it] This presentation was based on D'Ambrosio, C. and Edward N.Wolff. 2001. "Is Wealth Becoming More Polarized in the United States?". Unpublished [PDF]
Abstract: "Recent work has documented a rising degree of wealth inequality in the United States between 1983 and 1998. In this paper we look at another dimension of the distribution: polarization. Using techniques developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) and extended by D'Ambrosia (2001), we examine whether a similar pattern exists with regard to trends in wealth polarization over this period. The approach followed provides a decomposition method, based on counterfactual distributions, that allows one to monitor which factors modified the entire distribution and precisely where on the distribution these factors had an effect. An index of polarization is provided, as are summary statistics of the observed movements and of distance and divergence among the estimated and the counterfactual distributions. The decomposition method is applied to U.S. data on the distribution of wealth between 1983 and 1998. We find that polarization between homeowners and tenants and among different educational groups continuously increased from 1983 to 1998, while polarization by income class continuously decreased. In contrast, polarization by racial group increased from 1983 to 1989 and then declined from 1989 to 1998, while polarization by age group followed the opposite pattern. We also find that most of the observed variation in the overall wealth density over the 1983-98 period can be attributed to changes in the within-group wealth densities rather than changes in household characteristics."
15:15-16:45 "The economic costs of conflict: a case-control study for the Basque Country" Alberto Abadie [John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University | Cambridge (USA)] [ Alberto Abadie's Home Page ] This presentation was based on Abadie, A. and J. Gardeazabal. 2001. "The economic costs of conflict: a case-control study for the Basque Country". Unpublished.
Abstract: "This paper investigates the economic effects of conflict, using the terrorist conflict in the Basque Country as a case study. Our analysis rests on two different strategies. First, we use an optimal combination of other regions to construct a "synthetic'' control region which resembles most of the relevant economic characteristics of the Basque Country before the outset of political terrorism in the 1970's. The subsequent economic evolution of this "counterfactual'' Basque Country without terrorism is compared to the actual experience of the Basque Country. We find that, after the outbreak of terrorism, per capita GDP in the Basque Country declined about 10 percent points relative to the synthetic control region. Moreover, this gap seemed to widen in response to spikes in terrorist activity. The second part of this study uses the truce declared in September 1998 as a natural experiment to estimate the effects of the conflict. If the terrorist conflict was perceived to have a negative impact on the Basque economy, stocks of firms with a significant part of their business in the Basque Country should have shown a positive relative performance as the truce became credible, and a negative relative performance at the end of the cease-fire. We find evidence that is consistent with this conjecture using event study methods."
17:00-18:00 "Income distributions in Uruguay: the effects of economic and institutional reforms" Carlos Gradín [(Universidade de Vigo | Vigo (Spain)] [mailto: cgradin@uvigo.es] This presentaton was partly based on Gradín, C. and M. Rossi. 2000. "Polarización y desigualdad salarial en Uruguay, 1986-97." El trimestre económico, 267.
Abstract: "The analysis of the evolution of wage polarization in Uruguay during the last twelve years shows that the distribution of wages has become progressively more unequal and, most of all, more polarized. Increased premia to skill and experience, together with increased wage differentials by economic sector, are in the root of this process."
The information and links provided in this page were finally updated in September 2001, by way of memory of the 4th Urrutia Elejalde Summer School.