| Presentación |
| 2003 |
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10:00-11:00 "Persistent instability in polarized opinion formation and collective decision making" Rene Torenvlied [Faculty of Social Sciences, Utrecht University | Utrecht (The Netherlands)] [ René Torenvlied's Home Page ] This presentation was based on Flache, A. and R. Torenvlied. 2001. Persistent instability in polarized opinion formation and collective decision-making. Unpublished [PDF]
Abstract: "In this article we present a simple model of opinion formation and collective decision making, which identifies the conditions for unstable, non-linear outcomes of these processes. We propose a simple modification of the commonly used model of French from 1957: social actors change their influence in order to avoid a future outcome they do not like. The analysis of a simple, 3-member group shows that the social structure of the influence process has an important impact on the likelihood of persistent instability: one condition is polarization, a second is the presence of a bouncing subgroup or actor. The third condition is the intolerance for a discrepancy between the future outcome and the current opinion. In a complex 6-actor group computer simulations reveal very complex oscillations for intermediate levels of intolerance. The likelihood of these oscillations is discussed, as well as its consequences for the predictability of opinion formation and collective decision-making conditions."
11:00-11:45 Presentations by junior participants 11:00-11:20 "Rivalry, exclusion and coalition" Santiago Sánchez Pages [Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC | Barcelona (Spain)] Abstract: "We analyze a situation where individuals and coalitions can obtain effective property rights over a resource by means of an exclusion contest. Players face a trade-off when they decide to incorporate new members: Big coalitions control the resource more likely but their members have more diluted property rights. It turns out that the grand coalition is stable if players are commited to minimize deviators' pay- offs but not when players play best responses, exclusion investments present increasing returns or the production technology present negative ones."
11:20-11:45 "Income distribution and economic growth" Araceli Ortega [University of Essex | Essex (UK)] Abstract: "In recent literature the relationship between income distribution and economic growth has been found to depend on several economic factors such as whether the country or group of countries to be analysed are set in a perfect or imperfect capital markets context, where moral hazard, indivisibility in investments, and dual economic characteristics playa determinant role to define this relation. Part of this literature focus on one hand on whether or not the country's degree of openness also has influence on this relation (theoretical side) and on the other hand, whether the methodology, period lengths and data quality used have some influence in the findings (empirical side). Using dynamic panel data forthe 32 States of Mexico, we have found that inequality and growth are positively related. And when using OLS for different periods we have two kinds of relationships: a negative influence of inequality over growth when a period of low trade policies is considered (non-trade period and the period when Mexico joined the GATT), whereas we identified a positive influence on growth when a period of a more open trade is taken into account (the period after Mexico signed the NAFTA). To complete the research, we take into account the fiscal effects of inequality on growth finding that under the fiscal framework the relation between growth and inequality is unstable and relies on the explanatory variables involved."
12:00-13:30 "Identity conflicts and fair resolutions" Asha Kasher [Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University | Tel-Aviv (Israel)] [Asha Kasher's Home Page ] Kasher, A. and A. Rubinstein. 1998. "On the Question 'Who is a J'? A Social Choice Approach." FIER & SIES Working Paper 20-98; Kasher, A. s.d. "Collective Identity." Available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~kasher/piden.htm
Abstract [Kasher and Rubinstein 1998]: "The determination of "who is a J"' within a society is treated as an aggregation of the views of the members of the society regarding this question. Methods, similar to those used in Social Choice theory are applied to axiomatize three criteria for detennining who is a J: I) a J is whoever defines oneselfto be a J. 2) a J is whoever a "dictator" determines is a J. 3) a J is whoever an "oligarchy" of individuals agrees is a J."
15:15-16:45 "Inductive inference: an axiomatic approach" David Schmeidler [School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University | Tel Aviv (Israel)] [ David Schmeidler's Home Page ] This presentation was based on Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler. 2001. "Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach." Unpublished. [PDF]
Abstract: "A predictor is asked to rank eventualities according to their plauibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking given any memory that consists of Þnitely many past cases. Mild con- sistency requirements on these rankings imply that they have a numerical representation via a matrix assigning numbers to eventuality-case pairs, as follows. Given a memory, each eventuality is ranked accord- ing to the sum of the numbers in its row, over cases in memory. The number attached to an eventuality-case pair can be interpreted as the degree of support that the past lends to the plausibility of the eventuality. Special cases of this result may be viewed as axiomatizing kernel methods for estimation of densities and for classiÞcation problems. Interpreting the same result for rankings of theories or hypotheses, rather than of specific eventualities, it is shown that one may ascribe to the predictor subjective conditional probabilities of cases given theories, such that her rankings of theories agree with rankings by the likelihood functions."
The information and links provided in this page were finally updated in September 2001, by way of memory of the 4th Urrutia Elejalde Summer School.
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